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Inefficient rushes in auctions
Ángel Hernando-Veciana
Departamento de Economia, Universidad Carlos III
Fabio Michelucci
CERGE-EI
We analyze a setting common in privatizations, public tenders, and takeovers in
which the ex post efficient allocation, i.e., the first best, is not implementable. Our
first main result is that the open ascending auction is not second best because it
is prone to rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting simultaneously, that undermine
its efficiency. Our second main result is that the second best can be implemented
with a two-round auction used in real-life privatizations. We also show how this
result generalizes using a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule.
Keywords. Privatization, efficiency, auctions, mechanism design, multi-round
mechanisms.
JEL classification. D44, D82.
1. Introduction
The literature on auctions, going back to Vickrey’s 1961 seminal paper, has remarked
that the open ascending auction maximizes the expected gains from trade under fairly
general conditions. This is the theoretical basis for the widespread support for the use of
open ascending auctions in privatizations like the British 3G auction.1 It is also a widely
accepted argument in the analysis of markets that resemble an open ascending auction
like takeovers.2
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1See Binmore and Klemperer (2002).
2Burkart and Panunzi (2008) write, “The bidding contest which yields the winning offer is commonly
modeled as an English auction. In simple versions, bidders make offers and counter-offers at no cost,
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The above arguments are based on the observation that under mild conditions the
open ascending auction implements the ex post efficient allocation, the first best, when-
ever it is implementable.3,4 However, the first best is not implementable in many natu-
ral models of privatizations, and also public tenders and takeover contests if, as is often
the case, there is an incumbent.5 Suppose, for instance, franchise bidding for a service
that was previously operated by one of the bidders, the incumbent. It seems plausible
that the incumbent has private information about the demand of the service and lower
setup costs but may have larger marginal costs than the other bidders, the entrants. In
this case, the first best allocates to the incumbent when the demand is small and allo-
cates to the entrant with largest value, otherwise, but this is not implementable because
it is not a monotone allocation.
Our first main result, Proposition 2, shows that the open ascending auction is not
second best in a general model with an incumbent that encompasses the above ex-
ample. The reason is that the information endogenously disclosed along the auction
prompts rushes, i.e., all active buyers drop their demand simultaneously, that under the
usual uniformly random tie-breaking rule undermine the efficiency of the allocation;
see Proposition 3. This result is consistent with some anecdotal evidence reported, for
instance, by Binmore and Klemperer (2002) in the British 3G auction:
The first withdrawal came in round 94 as the price of the cheapest license passed £2 billion
($3 billion), and four more withdrawals followed almost immediately.
Consider, as an illustration, our example above. The incumbent knows his value and
thus bids until the price reaches it, as in a private value setting. Moreover, we show
that the second best allocates the good to the entrant with the largest value in cases in
which the incumbent has larger value than the entrants. Hence, implementing the sec-
ond best requires that the entrants remain active at prices at which they make a loss
when winning. This is what happens in equilibrium, and as a consequence, rushes arise
after the incumbent quits and his type gets revealed. This explains the inefficiencies
of our first main result as standard tie-breaking rules do not guarantee that the good
each offer incrementally higher than the previous, until the bidder with the highest valuation wins at a
price equal to the valuation of the second highest bidder. Thus, competition leads to an efficient control
allocation.”
3An allocation is implementable if it is the equilibrium outcome of some mechanism. This definition
differs from the notion of full implementation that requires the allocation to be the unique equilibrium
outcome of some mechanism.
4Indeed, the cases in which the open ascending auction fails to be efficient when the first best is imple-
mentable are special. For instance, they do not arise in our model. More generally, Krishna (2003) shows
that under the assumption that each bidder’s value function is an increasing function that is additively sep-
arable into a private and a common component, which is a reasonable approximation, the open ascending
auction implements the first best whenever the private value is increasing, which is a sufficient and (al-
most) necessary condition for the implementability of the first best. Choi et al. (2015) extend this result to
a more general setting with insiders.
5See examples in Maskin (1992), Boone and Goeree (2009), and Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci
(2011).
Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) Inefficient rushes in auctions 275
is allocated to the entrant with the largest value6 as required by the second best. Our
second main result, Proposition 5, is that the second best can be implemented with a
two-round auction that corrects the inefficiencies of rushes while preserving the good
properties of the open ascending auction. This second finding not only has a norma-
tive component, but also explains why our two-round auction is used in real life pri-
vatizations like ENI’s (see Caffarelli 1998 and Perry et al. 2000), Telebras’ privatization
(see Dutra and Menezes 2002), and the 2007 Nigerian 800 MHz auction (see Nigerian-
Communications-Commission 2007).
In our two-round auction, bidders submit sealed bids, the initial bids, in the first
round and, in the second round, each of the two bidders submitting the largest initial
bids, the top bidders, may raise their initial bids to determine their final bids. The winner
is the top bidder, who submits the largest final bid and pays the other final bid. As in an
open ascending auction, the second round is a second price auction with two bidders.7
However, one key difference is that the initial bids of our two-round auction commit
each entrant to a different minimum bid in the second round. Thus, entrants do not
necessarily tie if they stick to their minimum prices, which explains our second main
result.
The main difference between the open ascending auction and our two-round auc-
tion is that the bidders get continuous feedback about the prices at which rivals quit in
the former auction but not in the latter. In this sense, our results show that disrupting
the flow of information can be socially beneficial in certain environments.
Although the logic of our results is relatively transparent, our analysis has three chal-
lenges. First, one needs to establish that a rush leads to a tie. This is not obvious because
the equilibrium conditions usually impose very little restrictions in information sets of
the open ascending auctions in which there are more than two bidders active, as illus-
trated by Bikhchandani and Riley (1991). Hence, there could be an equilibrium in which
only the entrant with the highest type remains active at the prices at which a rush could
start. Second, one also needs to show that the random allocation typical of ties is in-
efficient. The challenge here is that Gershkov et al. (2013) and Hernando-Veciana and
Michelucci (2014) provide auction examples in which the second best is a random allo-
cation. We prove that this is not the case in our setting and provide a characterization of
the second best that builds on the parallelism between the social problem and the prob-
lem solved by the entrants in auctions with a final round equivalent to a second price
auction. Third, the equilibrium analysis of both the open ascending auction and our
two-round auction does not follow from the usual analysis of open ascending auctions.
This is because when the first best is not implementable, the equilibrium allocation is
not ex post efficient, i.e., there is ex post regret, which requires a novel equilibrium char-
acterization. Besides, this complicates the study of deviations in the early rounds of the
auction.
6Nonstandard tie-breaking rules can solve the inefficiencies, as we show in the Supplementary Appendix,
available in a supplementary file on the journal website, http://econtheory.org/supp/2513/supplement.
pdf. This alternative is less appealing since it requires payments from the losers. Furthermore, the tie-
breaking rule becomes an additional round of bidding, which makes it more similar to a two-round auction.
7The last round of the open ascending auction is not a second price auction, but it is strategically
equivalent.
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The simplicity of our two-round auction makes it well suited to be used in practice.
However, two rounds may be insufficient to aggregate the information required to max-
imize efficiency in cases with more than one incumbent. Still, we can use the insights of
our two-round auction to show that a survival auction with a novel tie-breaking rule out-
performs the open ascending auction. The survival auction is a particular multi-round
auction whose properties have been praised by Fujishima et al. (1999) and Kagel et al.
(2007).
The most closely related paper is our earlier work, Hernando-Veciana and Micheluc-
ci (2011). It shows that the open ascending auction implements the second best if there
are only two bidders. In this case, there are no ties after a rush and thus none of the
conclusions derived here applies. Besides, our earlier work did not face the challenges
we describe above because challenges one and three are a consequence of having more
than two bidders, and challenge two does not arise when one restricts to deterministic
allocations as in our earlier work.
Our results complement the analysis of Klemperer (1998), Perry et al. (2000),
Klemperer (2002), Dutra and Menezes (2002), Levin and Ye (2008), Ye (2007), Boone and
Goeree (2009), and Abraham et al. (2014). They provide settings in which a two-round
auction gives greater expected revenue than open ascending auctions. Their arguments
are unrelated to ours since, in their settings, two-round auctions do not do better than
open ascending auctions in terms of social surplus maximization. For instance, Perry
et al. (2000) consider a symmetric setting in which both the open ascending auction and
their two-round auction implement the first best, whereas Boone and Goeree (2009)
conjecture that a variation of the open ascending auction that uses proxy bids and a
nonstandard tie-breaking rule could implement the second best.
The inefficiencies in our setting are due to rushes that arise when the first best is
not implementable.8 The efficiency of the open ascending auction when the first best is
implementable has been studied by Maskin (1992), Krishna (2003), Dubra et al. (2009),
Birulin and Izmalkov (2011), and Choi et al. (2015). The last paper is the closest as it also
considers a setting with incumbents. The difference, though, is that their assumptions
rule out the possibility that under the efficient allocation a change in an incumbent’s
type that increases his value moves the good from the incumbent to another bidder. This
possibility is precisely the main focus of attention of our paper as our earlier example of
franchise bidding illustrates.
Since we assume a one-dimensional type space, we do not explicitly consider the
inefficiencies due to the multidimensionality of the type space; see Maskin (1992, 2000),
Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Eso and Maskin (2000), and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001).
In their case, the implementable allocations only depend on each bidder’s type up to
a particular one-dimensional projection, which is usually insufficient for the first best.
Still, our analysis can be applied to the reduced form model in which each bidder’s type
8Bulow and Klemperer (1994) have pointed out a similar effect to ours in open descending auctions: one
bidder decreasing his demand may prompt other bidders to decrease their demands simultaneously,—
leading to a tie. Their effect, however, requires multiunit sales and it is unrelated to the implementability of
the first best.
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is equal to these one-dimensional projections of the original model, as explained by
Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2008).
Next, we define the theoretical setting, Section 2, and characterize the second best,
Section 3. Section 4 provides a realistic setting in which our model applies. We analyze
in Sections 5, 6, and 7 the open ascending auction, our two-round auction, and our
survival auction, respectively. Section 8 concludes. The Appendix contains the main
proofs and the Supplementary Appendix contains some additional results.
2. The model
One unit of an indivisible good is put up for sale to n+ 1 bidders, n > 1, with quasilinear
preferences in money. Bidder 1, the incumbent (male), puts monetary value vˆ(s1) ≥ 0
in getting the good and each bidder i = 1, the entrants (female), puts monetary value
v(si s1) ≥ 0, where s1 and si denote, respectively, bidder 1’s and bidder i’s private in-
formation. We assume that sj , j ∈ {12    n + 1}, is equal to the realization of an inde-
pendent random variable, with distribution Fj , density fj , and support normalized to
be [01]. We assume that both vˆ and v are increasing, strictly in the case of vˆ and the
first argument of v. To simplify the exposition, we assume that the functions v and vˆ are
continuous, although our results do not hinge on this assumption.
This model captures situations in which one bidder has inside information about a
common component of the bidders’ values. One example is the problem described in
the Introduction, which is typical in privatizations and public tenders. Another exam-
ple is the sale of a company where the common value component is the stand alone
value of assets and the private values, bidders specific synergies. In this example, inside
information arises when a firm has special links with the management team, for exam-
ple, a white knight in the case of a hostile takeover; see Section C of our Supplementary
Appendix.
Our assumptions are sufficiently general to model cases in which the ex post efficient
allocation is not implementable while allowing for a tractable characterization of the
second best. We discuss along the text the robustness of our results to our assumptions,
in particular in footnote 12, in the third paragraph after Proposition 2 and in Section 7.
3. The first best and the second best
This section introduces the concepts of the first best and the second best, and provides a
tractable characterization of the second best. These concepts and the characterization
play a central role in the statement and discussion of our results. We start with some
preliminary definitions.
An allocation is a measurable function p from the set of types [01]n+1 into the
(n+ 1)-dimensional simplex (n + 1) such that pi(s) denotes the probability of allo-
cating the good to bidder i when the vector of types is s. We say that an allocation p is
first best if it only allocates to the bidder with highest value. This is characterized by the
following function.
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Definition 1. Let ρ : [01] → [01] be implicitly defined by v(ρ(s1) s1)= vˆ(s1) if a solu-
tion exists. Otherwise, ρ(s1)≡ 0 if v(0 s1) > vˆ(s1) and ρ(s1)≡ 1 if v(1 s1) < vˆ(s1).
Our assumptions that v and vˆ are continuous and that v is strictly increasing in its
first argument imply that ρ is well defined. They also imply that that an entrant with
type si has lower value than an incumbent with type s1 if si < ρ(s1), whereas the opposite
happens if si > ρ(s1). Consequently, an allocation p is first best if p1(s)= 1 when ρ(s1) >
s(1) ≡max{sj}j =1, and pi(s)= 1 for i = 1 when si > ρ(s1) and si = s(1).
We are interested in the set of implementable allocations. An allocation p is im-
plementable if there exists a truthful equilibrium in a direct mechanism (px). A di-
rect mechanism is a pair of measurable functions (px), where p is an allocation and
x : [01]n+1 → (n+ 1) is a payment function. A direct mechanism (px) defines a game
in which each bidder announces a type, and pi(s) denotes the probability that i gets
the good and xi(s) gets her payment to the auctioneer when the vector of announced
types is s ∈ [01]n+1. A truthful equilibrium of a direct mechanism is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium in which all the bidders announce their true types. By the revelation prin-
ciple, there is no loss of generality in restricting to the truthful equilibrium of direct
mechanisms.
Lemma 1. The first best is implementable if and only if ρ is weakly increasing.
This condition is equivalent to the usual single crossing condition in auctions; see
Krishna (2010, pp. 101 and 146).
We say that an allocation is second best if it maximizes the expected social surplus,∫
[01]n
∫
[01]
(
p1(s)vˆ(s1)+
∑
i =1
pi(s)v(si s1)
)
dF1(s1)dF−1(s−1) (1)
subject to p implementable, where F−1(s−1) stands for
∏
j =1 Fj(sj). The next function is
instrumental to characterize the second best.
Definition 2. Let φ : [01] → [01] be
φ(si) ∈ argmax
q∈[01]
∫ q
0
(
v(si s1)− vˆ(s1)
)
dF1(s1) (2)
Lemma 2. The function φ is increasing and uniquely defined by (2) a.e.
To understand the intuitive meaning of the function φ, add the constant∫ 1
0 vˆ(s1)dF1(s1) to the objective function of (2), substitute q by φ˜(si), and take expec-
tations with respect to si, assuming that si follows the distribution of the maximum of
the entrants’ types s(1) to get
∫ 1
0
(∫ φ˜(s(1))
0
v(s(1) s1)dF1(s1)+
∫ 1
φ˜(s(1))
vˆ(s1)dF1(s1)
)
dF(1)(s(1))
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where F(1)(s(1)) ≡∏n+1i=2 Fi(s(1)). This expression is equal to the expected social surplus
generated by an allocation that assigns the good to the entrant with the highest type
s(1) if φ˜(s(1)) ≥ s1 and otherwise to the incumbent. We refer to this allocation as the
allocation associated to φ˜. Thus, the allocation associated to φ in (2) is the allocation
that gives maximum expected social surplus among the allocations that are associated
to the set of functions φ˜ : [01] → [01]. We use this property next.
Proposition 1. The second best allocation is unique (up tomeasure zero sets) and equal
to the allocation associated to φ.
In the proof of the proposition, we show that the second best allocation must be de-
terministic, be monotone, and only allocate to either the incumbent or the entrant with
largest type;9 thus, it is an allocation associated to an increasing function φ˜ : [01] →
[01]. Thus, the proposition follows from the property stated immediately above the
proposition and the fact that monotone allocations are implementable.10
4. An economic application: Privatization with an incumbent
The purpose of this section is twofold. First, it provides a realistic setting in which the
first best is not implementable.11 Second, it presents an illustration of the different ele-
ments of our analysis.
The application here is a general version of the example discussed in the Introduc-
tion. A set of firms indexed by i ∈ {12     n + 1} compete for a privatized service that
gives profits π(ACi) after the firm incurs a setup cost Ki, and where A denotes a de-
mand shifter and Ci denotes an individual variable cost shifter, e.g., firm i’s marginal
cost. Profit π(ACi) is continuous, increasing in A, decreasing in Ci, and strictly sub-
modular in (ACi):
∂2π(ACi)
∂A∂Ci
< 0. The interpretation of submodularity is that the higher
the demand, the more beneficial it is for the firm to have lower variable costs. This as-
sumption is satisfied by most of the economic models that can give rise to the func-
tion π. An example is π(ACi) = (A−Ci)22 , which corresponds to the sale of a license
to operate an unregulated monopoly with linear demand Q(p) = A − p and constant
marginal cost Ci.
Firm 1 is an incumbent already operating the service. It privately knows the demand
for service A, has setup costs K1 =K, and has a commonly known variable cost parame-
ter C. Each of the other firms—the entrants—has the same setup cost Ki =K+, which
is greater than the incumbent’s, i.e.,  > 0, but have a variable cost parameter C − δi,
which is lower than the incumbent’s, where δi ≥ 0 is firm i’s private information.12
9An allocation p is deterministic if p(s) ∈ {01}n+1 and monotone if pi(s) is increasing in si for all i.
10Indeed, Section 6 provides a mechanism that implements the allocation associated to φ.
11The Supplementary Appendix has another application based on the model of privatizations of Boone
and Goeree (2009). Note that although, their model differs from ours in that the incumbent has a two-
dimensional signal, their Assumption 2 means that their analysis is formally equivalent to a model in which
the incumbent has a one-dimensional signal equal to his value.
12The assumption that the entrants’ marginal cost is private information but the incumbent’s is com-
monly known is for simplicity. It makes the connection with our general model of Section 2 straightfor-
ward. Our analysis could be easily extended to a model in which both the incumbent’s marginal cost and
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In terms of our notation in the rest of the paper, the model of this section corre-
sponds to A = s1, where s1 is a random variable with distribution F1, and δi = si + δ
(i = 1) for some δ > 0 and si a random variable with distribution Fi. Moreover,
vˆ(s1) = π(s1C)−K
v(si s1) = π(s1C − δ− si)−K −
In this case, the equation that defines ρ is
0= π(s1C − δ− si)−π(s1C)−= −
∫ C
C−δ−si
(
∂π(s1x)
∂x
)
dx− (3)
Thus, in the case of interior solutions ρ(s1) ∈ (01), the assumptions on the monotonic-
ity and submodularity of π imply that ρ is a strictly decreasing function, which as a result
of Lemma 1 implies that the first best allocation is not implementable. The second best
is characterized by the solution to (2) whose maximand becomes∫ q
0
(
π(s1C − δ− si)−π(s1C)−
)
dF1(s1)
The submodularity of π implies that the integrand above is increasing in s1 and, thus,
the above expression is convex in q, which implies that the corresponding problem in
(2) has a corner solution. This means that φ(si) is equal to either 0 or 1, depending on
whether ∫ 1
0
(
π(s1C − δ− si)−π(s1C)
)
dF1(s1)− (4)
is negative or positive, respectively. Since (4) is continuous and strictly increasing in si,
our function φ is characterized by the value of si, say s˘, that makes (4) equal to 0. Thus
φ(si)=
{
0 if si < s˘
1 if si ≥ s˘
Figure 1 illustrates ρ and φ in the application of this section. The former function
maps types of the incumbent in the vertical axis into a value for the highest type of the
entrants in the horizontal axis: the first best allocates to the entrant with highest type
above the graph of ρ and to the incumbent otherwise. The graph of the function φ has
a similar interpretation with respect to the second best. The difference, though, is that
φ maps values of the highest type of the entrants in the horizontal axis into incumbent’s
types in the vertical axis. Finally, note that s˘ ∈ [0ρ(0)) becauseπ(0C−δ− s˘)−π(0C)−
< 0, since (4) is equal to zero at si = s˘ and its integrand is strictly increasing in s1.
the demand shifter are the incumbent’s private information. In this case, the incumbent’s signal is mul-
tidimensional and we can apply the observation of Dasgupta and Maskin (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu
(2001), and Hernando-Veciana and Michelucci (2008) that in a multidimensional setting such as ours, the
equilibrium allocation does not depend on more than a one-dimensional summary of each agent’s private
information. Thus, its equilibrium analysis could be done on a reduced form model in which each agent’s
type is equal to the one-dimensional summary of the original model. Our analysis could be applied to this
reduced form model.
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Figure 1. The functions ρ and φ in the economic application in Section 4.
5. The open ascending auction
In this section, we show that there is no equilibrium of the open ascending auction that
implements the second best allocation under general conditions. Next, we show that
the equilibrium yields rushes.
We assume the model of the open ascending auction described by Krishna (2003).
This auction model is a variation of the Japanese auction proposed by Milgrom and We-
ber (1982) in which the identities of the active bidders are observable. Our auction is a
dynamic game that starts with the price set equal to zero and all the bidders active. Both
the price and the identities of the active bidders are publicly observable at any moment.
The price increases continuously until one or more bidders decide to become inactive,
i.e., quit. The decision to quit is irreversible. At that point, the price stops increasing and
the following algorithm is implemented. If only one bidder remains active, this bidder
gets the good at the current price. If all the bidders have quit, the good is allocated with
equal probability among the bidders who last quit at the current price. Otherwise, the
identify of the bidders who last quit is made public and bidders who have not quit yet
can decide (independently and simultaneously) whether to quit. If some other bidders
quit, we repeat the former algorithm. Otherwise, the price resumes increasing continu-
ously until one or more other bidders quit. In this case, we repeat the former algorithm.
5.1 The second best and the open ascending auction
The next lemma gives some properties of the equilibrium bidding.
Lemma 3. In any undominated equilibrium of the open ascending auction, the following
statements hold:
(i) The incumbent with type s1 quits at price vˆ(s1).
(ii) An entrant with type si finds it optimal to quit at price max{v(si s1) vˆ(s1)} in in-
formation sets in which the incumbent has quit at price vˆ(s1).
(iii) An entrant with type si finds it optimal to quit at price v(φ(si)) if all the other
entrants have already quit when this price is reached.
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Lemma 3(i) and (ii) follow from the property of open ascending auctions that a bid-
der who knows his value finds it optimal to remain active until the price reaches his
value. The proof of (iii) uses that the entrant’s optimal bid b ∈ [vˆ(s1) vˆ(1)] in the corre-
sponding information sets maximizes
∫ vˆ−1(b)
s1
(
v(si s˜1)− vˆ(s˜1)
) dF1(s˜1)
1− F(s1) 
which equals (2) if one changes vˆ−1(b) by q, multiplies by 1 − F(s1), and adds∫ s1
0 (v(si s˜1)− vˆ(s˜1))dF1(s˜1).
Proposition 2. There is no undominated equilibrium of the open ascending auction
that implements the second best if there exists an open set of types for which si < ρ(s1) and
s1 <φ(si), i.e., that the first best allocates to the incumbent and the second best allocates
to one of the entrants.
The key elements of the proof of Proposition 2 are that the incumbent bids his value
and that, for the vector of types in the proposition, the second best allocates to the en-
trant with the highest type whereas the first best allocates to the incumbent, and thus
his value is larger than the entrants’. This means that implementing the second best
requires that the entrant with the highest type wins at prices that are greater than her
value, i.e., that there is ex post regret. In this case, all the active entrants realize that the
price is greater than their values once the incumbent quits and, thus, they quit imme-
diately after, i.e., there is a rush. If more than one entrant is active, there is a tie and the
allocation is not second best because the tie-breaking rule allocates with equal proba-
bility. This argument does not necessarily mean that rushes arise in equilibrium as it is
still possible that there are equilibria that do not implement the second best in which
there are no rushes. However, Section 5.2 shows that rushes indeed arise in equilibrium.
The main challenge of the proof is to show that a rush leads to a tie. In principle, the
huge multiplicity of equilibria typical of open ascending auctions (see Bikhchandani
and Riley 1991) suggests that there could be an equilibrium in which all the entrants
but the one with highest type quit before the price reaches the point at which a rush
could start. Our proof shows that this is not possible. This is facilitated somehow by
the assumption that the incumbent knows his value and thus has a unique weakly dom-
inant strategy. However, we believe that our arguments could still be applied in two
cases: when the elimination of weakly dominated strategies sufficiently narrows the in-
cumbent’s strategy or when one restricts to equilibria in which a bidder quits at a price
equal to her expected value conditional on the information derived in equilibrium from
the event that all the remaining bidders also quit at the same price. The latter restric-
tion is consistent with most of the theoretical analyses of open ascending auctions, e.g.,
Milgrom and Weber (1982).
The conditions of Proposition 2 are met in our application in Section 4 by any func-
tion π if , the difference in setup costs of the entrants and the incumbent, is neither so
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low that the first best always allocate to one of the entrants nor so high that the second
best always allocate to the incumbent.13
5.2 Equilibrium rushes
In this subsection, we characterize the equilibrium of the open ascending auction under
the conditions of Proposition 2 to illustrate that rushes, i.e., all active bidders quitting
simultaneously, occur in equilibrium. To simplify the description of the equilibrium,
we assume in this subsection that (I) all the entrants’ types follow the same distribution
F with density f , i.e., Fj = F for all j = 1; (II) there are only two entrants, i.e., n = 2;
(III) ρ(0) > 0; (IV) ρ is strictly decreasing, and (V) φ(si)= 1 for all si ∈ [01].14 We explain
at the end of the section how our equilibrium characterization must be modified once
these simplifying assumptions are relaxed. To guarantee the existence and uniqueness
of γ below, we also assume that f and f1 are bounded away from zero, and that v, vˆ, and
f1 are differentiable.
Our proposed equilibrium is defined by the bids in Lemma 3(i)–(iii); in the remaining
information sets, an entrant with type si quits at price vˆ(γ(si)), where γ is the following
increasing function.
Definition 3. Let γ be defined in si ∈ [0 s] as the unique continuous solution to15
β
∫ 1
γ(si)
(
v(si s1)− vˆ(s1)
) dF1(s1)
1− F1
(
γ(si)
)
+ (1−β)F
(
ρ
(
γ(si)
))− F(si)
1− F(si)
v
(
si γ(si)
)− vˆ(γ(si))
2
= 0
(5)
starting at γ(0)= 0, where s is the point where the solution crosses the graph of ρ and
β≡
f (si)
γ′(si)
(
1− F1
(
γ(si)
))
f (si)
γ′(si)
(
1− F1
(
γ(si)
))+ (1− F(si))f1(γ(si))
 (6)
and let γ(si)≡ 1 in si ∈ (s1].
The left panel of Figure 2 plots the function γ in a version of Figure 1 that satisfies
assumptions (III)–(V): γ starts at (00) and satisfies (5) whenever v(s1 si)− vˆ(s1) < 0 and
jumps to 1 afterward.
13The details are available in the Supplementary Appendix.
14We have formulated (III), (IV), and (V) in terms of the endogenous objects ρ and φ to make them
more transparent. Since v(si0) increases with si, Definition 1 implies that (III) is equivalent to v(00) −
vˆ(0) < 0. By Definition 1, (IV) is equivalent to v(si s1) − vˆ(s1) crossing zero at most once and from below
as s1 increases from 0 to 1. Since v(si s1) is increasing in si, Definition 2 means that (V) is equivalent to∫ 1
0 (v(0 s1) − vˆ(s1))dF1(s1) >
∫ q
0 (v(0 s1) − vˆ(s1))dF1(s1), i.e.,
∫ 1
q (v(0 s1) − vˆ(s1))dF1(s1) > 0, for any q ∈
[01).
15The existence and uniqueness of γ follows from standard results in differential equations; see the Sup-
plementary Appendix.
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Figure 2. Illustration of the function γ and its role in the equilibrium.
The left hand side of (5) is equal to the expected utility of an entrant with type si who
marginally outbids the bidder quitting first under the assumption that the bidders use
our proposed bids. To see why, note that the lowest bid of the other bidders must be
equal to vˆ(γ(si)), and the continuation play, and thus payoffs, depends on whether this
lowest bid is the other entrant’s bid or the incumbent’s. These two cases have condi-
tional probabilities β and 1−β, respectively, where β is defined in (6).
If it is the other entrant who bids vˆ(γ(si)), the incumbent has a type higher than γ(si),
which is good news. In this case, our proposed bid function and assumption (V) imply
that our entrant remains active until the incumbent quits, which gives an expected pay-
off equal to the expression multiplied by β in (5).
If it is the incumbent who bids vˆ(γ(si)), his type is γ(si), which is bad news: since
(si γ(si)) lies in the region where v(si s1) − vˆ(s1) < 0, our entrant’s value v(si γ(si)) is
less than the current price vˆ(γ(si)). Thus, our entrant quits immediately after the in-
cumbent. A similar argument also implies that the other entrant also quits immediately
after the incumbent if her type lies in (si ρ(γ(si)); see the right panel of Figure 2. In this
case, both entrants tie. Otherwise, our entrant is outbid. The first quotient after (1−β)
in (5) indicates the conditional probability of a tie; the second quotient indicates the
expected losses in a tie.
In the region si ∈ (s1], our proposed strategy specifies that the entrant waits until
either the incumbent or the other entrant quits. As happened in the previous paragraph,
it is possible that our entrant incurs a loss when it is the incumbent who quits first. This
occurs when the entrant’s and incumbent’s types lie below the graph of ρ. However, this
loss is compensated by the gains when either the incumbent quits at a higher price or
when it is the other entrant who quits first.
Proposition 3. Under assumptions (I)–(V), the following profile of strategies is an equi-
librium:
• The incumbent quits at price vˆ(s1)when his type is s1.
• An entrant with type si quits at the following prices:
– Price vˆ(γ(si)) in information sets in which no bidder has quit yet, where γ is de-
fined in (5).
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– Price max{v(si s1) vˆ(s1)} in information sets in which the incumbent quits at a
price vˆ(s1).
– Price vˆ(φ(si))= vˆ(1) in information sets in which the incumbent is the only other
active bidder.
In this equilibrium, there are rushes, i.e., all active bidders quit simultaneously. They
occur when the vector of types (s1 s2 s3) satisfies s1 <min{γ(s2)γ(s3)} and max{s2 s3}<
ρ(s1). Since the entrants bid vˆ(γ(si)) and the incumbent bids vˆ(s1), the first condition
means that the incumbent quits before any of the two entrants. Since v(ρ(s1) s1)= vˆ(s1)
and v is an increasing function, the second condition means that both entrants quit
immediately after the incumbent (by Lemma 3(ii)). To the extent that it is possible to
construct examples in which both ρ(s1) and γ(si) are arbitrarily close to 1 in [01), as
we show in Proposition B of the Supplementary Appendix, the probability that there is a
rush may be arbitrarily close to 1.
We now discuss the consequences of relaxing (I)–(V). Relaxing (I) implies a different
equilibrium strategy for each entrant. This implies that several versions of the differ-
ential equation provided in (5), one per entrant, need to be considered. Relaxing (II)
requires characterizing the bid behavior in information sets in which the incumbent
and three or more entrants are active. The only complication is the notational burden.
Assumptions (III)–(V) guarantee that the set of types for which the conditions of Propo-
sition 2 apply lies at the bottom of the support of all the bidders’ types, as in Figure 2.
If there are several disconnected sets where the conditions of Proposition 2 apply, our
characterization requires considering a version of the differential equations in (5) for
each of these sets.
6. A two-round auction
In this section, we study a two-round auction that implements the second best. In the
first round, all bidders submit an initial bid; in the second round, the bidders submit-
ting the two highest initial bids—the top bidders—are allowed to revise their initial bids
upward to make their final bids after their identity has been revealed publicly. The good
is allocated to the top bidder who submits the highest final bid at a price equal to the
final bid of the other top bidder.16
We start by proposing a strategy profile to show next that it is an equilibrium. The
same reasons that explain Lemma 3 imply here that it is optimal for the incumbent to
bid his value and for the entrants to raise their final bids to vˆ(φ(si)) if the incumbent
is the other top bidder. These are features of our proposed strategies. Since the event
that the incumbent is not a top bidder is bad news for the entrants, our proposal is that
entrants do not raise their final bids in this case. Finally, the entrants’ initial bids are
given by the next function.
16We do not make the tie-breaking rule explicit because it is irrelevant for the analysis in this section.
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Definition 4. Let σ : [01] → [0∞) be a continuous strictly increasing function de-
fined as follows:17
• If φ(si)= 0,
σ(si)≡ v(si0)≤ vˆ(0) (7)
• If φ(si) > 0 and
∫ 1
0 (v(si s1)− vˆ(1))dF1(s1)≤ 0, σ(si) ∈ [vˆ(0) vˆ(φ(si))] solves∫ vˆ−1(σ(si))
0
(
v(si s1)− σ(si)
)
dF1(s1)+
∫ φ(si)
vˆ−1(σ(si))
(
v(si s1)− vˆ(s1)
)
dF1(s1)= 0 (8)
• If φ(si) > 0 and
∫ 1
0 (v(si s1)− vˆ(1))dF1(s1) > 0,
σ(si)≡
∫ 1
0
v(si s1)dF1(s1) > vˆ(1) (9)
In the first case, φ(si)= 0 (and Definition 2) means that it is unprofitable for the en-
trant to outbid the incumbent. This explains that our proposed initial bid in (7) is so low
that it is always outbid by the incumbent. In the last case,
∫ 1
0 (v(si s1)− vˆ(1))dF1(s1) > 0
means that the entrant’s expected value is greater than the incumbent’s maximum value.
This explains that our proposed initial bid in (9) is so high that it always outbids the in-
cumbent.
In the intermediate case, our proposed initial bid σ(si) trades off the expected gains
and losses of marginally outbidding the largest initial bid of the other entrants when the
bidders follow the proposed strategies. The losses correspond to the first term in (8) in
which the incumbent’s bid vˆ(s1) is less than σ(si). This has two implications. First, our
entrant is a top bidder together with the entrant submitting the largest initial bid of the
other entrants. Second, vˆ(s1) ≤ σ(si) is bad news, which explains why entrants do not
raise their final bids in our proposed strategy. Hence, our entrant wins and pays the
highest initial bid of the other entrants σ(si). The gains correspond to the second term
in (8) in which the incumbent’s bid vˆ(s1) is greater than σ(si). This has two implications.
First, our entrant and the incumbent are the top bidders. Second, vˆ(s1) ≥ σ(si) is good
news for our entrant, which explains why she raises her final bid in our proposed strat-
egy. Since the entrant’s final bid increases to vˆ(φ(si)), our entrant wins at a price equal
to the incumbent’s final bid vˆ(s1) if the incumbent’s type is less than φ(si).
Proposition 4. The following profile of strategies is an equilibrium of our two-round
auction:
• The incumbent bids vˆ(s1) in both rounds when his type is s1.
• An entrant with type si bids σ(si) in the first round.
• An entrant does not increase her bid in the second round if the other top bidder is
another entrant.
17In the Supplementary Appendix, we prove the inequalities in (7) and (9), and that the solution to (8)
lies in [vˆ(0) vˆ(φ(si))].
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• An entrant with type si bids vˆ(φ(si)) in the second round if the other top bidder is
the incumbent.
In the proof, we show, first, that (8) implies that an entrant has no incentive to devi-
ate locally in the first round and, second, that no incentive to deviate locally implies no
incentive to deviate globally. In the latter, we use that the entrant’s payoff is supermod-
ular in her type and initial bid when her final bid is determined optimally.
In the equilibrium of Proposition 4, entrants do not tie because their initial bids are
given by a strictly increasing function and their final bids are equal to their initial bids in
case the other top bidder is an entrant. Besides, the final bid of an entrant with type si
competing in the last round with the incumbent is raised to the point of outbidding the
incumbent if and only if his type is less than φ(si). Thus, the equilibrium implements
the allocation associated to φ, which explains our last result.
Proposition 5. The equilibrium in Proposition 4 implements the second best.
7. Multiple incumbents
The simplicity of our two-round auction makes it well suited to be used in practice. Fur-
thermore, in many applications there is only one incumbent. If there is more than one
incumbent, however, only two rounds may be insufficient to aggregate the information
needed to maximize efficiency and more complex mechanisms may be necessary. In
this section, we explore this possibility and show how the insights of our two-round auc-
tion can be used to construct a multi-round auction that outperforms the open ascend-
ing auction. Although our multi-round auction maximizes expected social surplus in a
general class, it still remains an open question whether it is second best. This requires
a tractable characterization of the second best, which is still a general challenge of the
auction literature.
We assume nI ≥ 1 incumbents and n− nI ≥ 1 entrants. An incumbent j ∈ {1     nI}
and an entrant i ∈ {nI + 1     n} put, respectively, a monetary value of vˆ(sj) and of
v(si sI) in getting the good, where sj , si, and sI denote, respectively, the type of j, the
type of i, and the vector of types of all the incumbents. We assume that sk, k ∈ {1     n},
is equal to the realization of an independent random variable, with distribution Fk, den-
sity fk, and support normalized to [01]. We assume that both vˆ and v are increasing
functions, strictly in the case of vˆ and the first argument of v. We also assume that v is
symmetric in the last nI arguments in the sense that v(si sI)= v(si s˜I) for any permuta-
tion s˜I of sI .
Our multi-round auction is a survival auction (see Fujishima et al. 1999) with a novel
tie-breaking rule. The auction starts with all bidders active and the minimum price set to
zero. In each round, the active bidders submit a sealed bid weakly larger than the current
minimum price: the bidder (or bidders) submitting the lowest bid becomes inactive and
her bid determines the minimum bid in the next round. Both the identity and the last
bid of the bidders declared inactive are announced publicly at the end of each round.
The auction ends once no more than one bidder remains active. The good is allocated
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to the bidder who submitted the highest bid in the last round, if there is only one. If
there are several bidders, we solve the tie by selecting the bidder who placed the highest
bid in the previous round. If this does not solve the tie, a uniformly random tie-breaking
rule is used among the bidders who tied in the last round. In all cases, the price that the
winner pays is the second highest bid in the last round.
Our survival auction combines the advantages of the open ascending auction and
of our two-round auction. Indeed, the survival auction with a uniformly random tie-
breaking rule is strategically equivalent to the open ascending auction. Thus, our sur-
vival auction implements the first best in the same cases as the open ascending auction
because the first best does not have ties with positive probability except in nongeneric
cases. However, we show next that by making use of past bids to solve ties, as in our
two-round auction, the efficiency of the allocation improves if the first best is not imple-
mentable.
To do so, we study an equilibrium of the survival auction that generalizes the logic
of the equilibrium of our two-round auction. We start with the following auxiliary defi-
nition that generalizes Definition 2 to our current setting.
Definition 5. For any j ∈ {1     nI}, s ∈ [01], and vector s−j = (s1     snI−1) ∈
[01]nI−1 with maximum component sj , let
φj(s; s−j)≡ argmax
sj≥sj
∫ sj
0
(
v(s s˜j s−j)− vˆ(s˜j)
)
dFj(s˜j) (10)
As in the case of φ, and because of the same arguments as in Lemma 2, φj is an
increasing function, uniquely defined by (10) almost everywhere.
In our proposed equilibrium, incumbents use, once again, their unique weakly dom-
inant strategy to bid their values. The entrants’ strategies are, however, more sophis-
ticated. We describe next the bid of an entrant with type s, distinguishing five cases
depending on who is still active:18
Case A. Three or more entrants and at least one incumbent. The entrant bids
v(s0    0) if all the incumbents are still active and bids v(s s1     sk     sk)
otherwise, where (s1     sk) is the vector of incumbents’ types inferred from
the prices at which they became inactive.19
Case B. Two entrants and at least two incumbents. The entrant bids vˆ(1).
18We do not describe the entrants strategy when one entrant and two or more incumbents are active
because our proposed bidding in case B makes it unnecessary for our analysis: any feasible bid function
works for Propositions 6 and 7.
19This is, sk = vˆ−1(pk), where pk is the price bid by the kth incumbent withdrawing from the auction.
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Case C. Two entrants and one incumbent. The entrant bids the σj(s) ∈
[vˆ(sj) vˆ(φj(s s−j))] that solves
∫ vˆ−1(σj(s))
sj
(
v(s s−j sj)− vˆ(sj)
)−
dFj(sj)
+
∫ φj(ss−j)
vˆ−1(σj(s))
(
v(s s−j sj)− vˆ(sj)
)
dFj(sj)= 0
(11)
for j, the identity of the incumbent still active, and s−j ≡ (s1     snI−1),
the vector of inferred types of the other incumbents, and sj its maximum
component.
Case D. Only one entrant and one incumbent. The entrant bids vˆ(φj(s; s−j)), where
j is the identity of the incumbent still active, and s−j is the vector of inferred
types of the other incumbents.
Case E. Only entrants. The entrant bids the maximum between the minimum bid
of the round and v(s s1     snI ), where (s1     snI ) is the inferred vector of
incumbents’ types.20
Intuitively, entrants bid their minimum value of the good that is compatible with the
information already inferred from the past play (Case A) until either only two entrants
remain active (Cases B and C) or all the incumbents have quit (Case E). In Case B, en-
trants bid so high that no incumbent outbids them until only one incumbent remains
active, Case C. In Case C, entrants’ bids are similar to the bid in the first round of our two-
round auction. Similarly to (8), (11) trades off the expected gains and losses of marginally
outbidding the other entrant who is still active at price σj(s) assuming the proposed
strategies, and thus that both entrants who are still active have the same type s. The
losses correspond to the first term in (11). They arise when the highest incumbent’s bid
vˆ(sj) is less than σj(s). In this case, the bidding in Case E means that each entrant bids
the minimum bid, which is equal to the incumbent’s bid vˆ(sj) or her value v(s s−j sj),
whichever is larger. The tie-breaking rule means that the entrant wins in both cases, but
he gets v(s s−j sj)− vˆ(sj) < 0 in the former case and v(s s−j sj)− v(s s−j sj)= 0 in the
latter. The gains are similar to those in (8). They arise when the highest incumbent’s
bid vˆ(sj) is greater than σj(s s−j). In this case, Case D means that the entrant competes
with the incumbent in the last round and makes a positive expected profit equal to the
second integral of (11).
20The proposed bids are always weakly greater than the minimum bid of the round. In Case E, this holds
true by definition. In Case B, this is because the bid is greater than any incumbent’s bid and there are
incumbents still active. When the game moves from Case B to Case C, this is because the minimum bid is
vˆ(sj), which is less than σj(s) by definition. In Cases A and D, this is because entrants submit weakly greater
bids than in the previous round. This is also the case when the game moves from Case A to Case C since
σj(s) ≥ v(s s−j  sj) at the solution of (11). To see why, note that the left hand side of (11) is decreasing in
σj(s), its first integral is zero at σj(s)= v(s s−j  sj), and the second integral is positive by Definition 5.
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Proposition 6. There exists an equilibrium of the survival auction in which the incum-
bents bid their values and the entrants follow a strategy satisfying Cases A–E above.
To understand why it is an equilibrium, note that a downward deviation in Case A
means that the entrant misses the opportunity to compete at profitable prices, whereas
an upward deviation allows him to compete additionally only in cases in which a higher
type entrant is still active and thus willing to bid up to higher prices. The high bidding in
Case B entails no risk to the entrant, as she can ensure being outbid by one incumbent
by bidding the minimum bid in the next round. The reason why entrants do not have
incentives to deviate in Case C is the same as in the first round of our two-round auction,
where (11) substitutes (8). Finally, Definition 5 means that the bid in Case D is optimal
and the fact that entrants know their values in Case E means that their bids in Case E are
optimal as in a private value auction.
Proposition 7. The equilibrium of the survival auction in Proposition 6 gives weakly
greater expected social surplus than any undominated equilibrium of the open ascend-
ing auction, strictly if rushes of several bidders arise in the open ascending auction with
positive probability.
The proof of the proposition uses that our survival auction assigns the good to either
the incumbent with highest type sj or the entrant with highest type s, depending on
whether sj is greater or less than φj(s s−j), respectively, for s−j , the vector of the other
incumbents’ types. In the proof, we show that this allocation maximizes the expected
social surplus among the allocations that satisfy two properties: that the probability with
which an incumbent gets the good is increasing in his type, keeping the others types
constant, and that an incumbent only gets the good if his type is the highest among the
incumbents. These two properties are satisfied in the open ascending auction when
incumbents use their weakly dominant strategy, which explains the proposition.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown in a setting relevant for privatizations, public tenders, and
takeover contests that the information disclosed along an open ascending auction gives
rise to rushes that hinder its efficiency. This result has implications that go beyond the
analysis of auctions since an open ascending auction is a reasonable model of bargain-
ing for real-life situation like takeovers. Besides, our model provides a tractable frame-
work in which to illustrate that more transparency in the market place can be detrimen-
tal for welfare because it may lead to inefficient rushes.
One consequence of rushes that we have not explored is that they may preclude in-
formation aggregation since they occur when a set of types quits at the same price, i.e.,
in a semipooling equilibrium. In a more general setting than ours in which all bidders
have private information about the common value component, this pooling of different
types suggests the paradoxical result that increasing the transparency of the price mech-
anism may lead to rushes that reduce the final amount of information disclosed. This
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suggests that more opaque markets may aggregate more information and thus be more
efficient. It may also have implications for the optimal design of an auction. We believe
that the exploration of these issues is a fruitful venue for future research.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1
The “only if” part follows from the fact that a necessary condition for implementability
of the first best is that the probability with which the incumbent gets the good condi-
tional on his type is an increasing function and this probability is equal to F(ρ(s1))n;
see Lemma 4 in the Supplementary Appendix. The “if” part follows from the fact that ρ
increasing implies that the first best is monotone and thus implementable.
Proof of Lemma 2
Since v(si s1) is strictly increasing in s1, the derivative of the maximand of (2) is single
crossing in s1, which means that there exists an increasing selection of maximizers of (2).
Besides, multiple maximizers can only exist at the discontinuity points of φ, but since φ
is increasing, and thus continuous a.e., φ is defined uniquely by (2) a.e.
Proof of Proposition 1
The proposition follows from three results: First, that the allocation associated to φ is
implementable. Second, that the allocation associated to φ gives maximum expected
social surplus among the allocations in . Third, that there exists an allocation in  that
gives strictly greater expected social surplus than any implementable allocation outside
. The first result is a direct implication of the fact that the allocation associated to φ
is monotone. See also footnote 10. That the second result holds true is explained in the
main text. To prove the third result, we show that the set of optimal solutions to a relaxed
version of the problem that defines the second best lies in . This relaxed problem is
defined by substituting the restriction to implementable allocations with the following
necessary condition for the incumbent’s incentive compatibility constraint:
Q1(s1p)≡
∫
[01]n
p1(s1 s−1)dF−1(s−1) increasing in s1 (12)
That this condition is necessary is shown in Lemma 4 in the Supplementary Appendix.
To show that the optimal solution for the relaxed problem belongs to , we use that
our relaxed problem can be solved in two stages and that any solution to the first stage
lies in . In this first stage, we maximize the expected social surplus, (1), with respect to
p subject to the constraint Q(·p)= Qˆ(·) for an arbitrary increasing function Qˆ : [01] →
[01]. The second stage consists of maximizing with respect to Qˆ the resulting outcome
of the first maximization subject to Qˆ increasing.
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The first stage problem corresponding to an arbitrary increasing function Qˆ :
[01] → [01] is
max
p:[01]n+1→(n+1)
∫ 1
0
vˆ(s1)Qˆ(s1)dF1(s1)
+
∫
[01]n+1
(∑
i =1
pi(s)v(si s1)
)
dF1(s1)dF−1(s−1)
s.t.
∫
[01]n
p1(s1 s−1)dF−1(s−1)= Qˆ(s1) ∀s1 ∈ [01]
(13)
Since p1(s)= 1−∑i =1pi(s), the constraint of this problem can be written as∫
[01]n
∑
i =1
pi(s1 s−1)dF−1(s−1)= 1− Qˆ(s1) ∀s1 ∈ [01] (14)
We characterize the solutions to (13), leaving aside the first term of the objective func-
tion, which is constant in p, and substituting the constraint by (14). The Lagrange func-
tion is ∫
[01]n+1
(∑
i =1
pi(s)v(si s1)
)
dF1(s1)dF−1(s−1)
−
∫ 1
0
λ(s1)
(∫
[01]n
∑
i =1
pi(s1 s−1)dF−1(s−1)−
(
1− Qˆ(s1)
))
ds1
where λ : [01] →R is the Lagrange multiplier. After some rearrangements, we get∫
[01]n+1
(∑
i =1
pi(s)
(
v(si s1)− λ(s1)
f1(s1)
))
dF1(s1)dF−1(s−1)+
∫ 1
0
λ(s1)
(
1− Qˆ(s1)
)
ds1
The optimal Lagrange multiplier λ∗ characterizes the optimal allocation of the prob-
lem in (13): the good is allocated to the entrant with the largest value v(si s1) if
v(si s1) >
λ∗(s1)
f1(s1)
; otherwise the good is allocated to the incumbent. Thus, the opti-
mal allocation can be characterized by a function ζ : [01] → [01] implicitly defined
by v(ζ(s1) s1) = λ∗(s1)f1(s1) if a solution exists and either 0 or 1, depending on whether
v(0 s1) >
λ∗(s1)
f1(s1)
or v(1 s1) <
λ∗(s1)
f1(s1)
, respectively. The good is allocated to the entrant with
highest type s(1) if s(1) ≥ ζ(s1) and otherwise to the incumbent. Consequently, to show
that the optimal allocation belongs to  only requires one to show that ζ is an increas-
ing function. This can be deduced from the constraint in (13). It implies that ζ satisfies
Qˆ1(s1) = F(1)(ζ(s1)) =∏n+1i=2 Fi(ζ(s1)), and, hence, the fact that Fi and Qˆ are increasing
implies that ζ is also increasing, as desired.
Proof of Lemma 3
Part (i) follows from the same arguments as in private value auctions: if the incumbent
quits at a price lower than vˆ(s1), he misses the opportunity to win at profitable prices
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and if he remains active when the price goes above vˆ(s1), he risks winning when the
price is higher than his value. Part (ii) can also be derived from a similar argument using
the fact that when the incumbent plays his weakly dominant strategy and quits at price
vˆ(s1), an entrant can infer that the incumbent’s type is equal to s1 and, thus, an entrant
with type si finds it optimal to quit at price v(si s1). Finally, to see why (iii) holds, note
that an entrant who plans to quit at b in an information set in which the only other active
bidder is the incumbent wins if and only if the incumbent’s bid vˆ(s1) is less than b and,
in this case, pays the incumbent’s bid. Hence, the expected payoff of our entrant is equal
to ∫ vˆ−1(b)
s1
(
v(si s˜1)− vˆ(s˜1)
) dF1(s˜1)
1− F1(s1)  (15)
By Definition 2 and Lemma 2, the unique maximizer of this function is b = vˆ(φ(si)) for
almost all si ∈ [01]. To see why, note that one can get the same maximand as in (2) by
multiplying (15) by 1 − F1(s1), adding
∫ s1
0 (v(si s˜1) − vˆ(s˜1))dF1(s˜1) (which are constant
with respect to b), and implementing the change of variable b= vˆ(q).
Proof of Proposition 2
We argue by contradiction. We assume an equilibrium that implements the second best
and show that an entrant has strict incentives to deviate.
In our argument we use two features. First, Lemma 3 pins down the incumbent’s
and entrants’ bids a.e. for the cases to which is applicable to. The claim with respect
to Lemma 3(i) is direct. The claim with respect to Lemma 3(iii) is a consequence of
the uniqueness of the optimizer of (2) a.e.; see Lemma 2. The claim with respect to
Lemma 3(ii) follows from the fact that there may be other optima only if a change in the
bid around the proposed optimum does not change the cases in which the bidder wins.
But this cannot happen in a strategy profile that implements the second best because
the second best requires that the entrants use the same strictly increasing bid function
after the entrant has quit.
Second, there exists a small interval of entrants’ types [s∗ s∗ + ] for  > 0, an incum-
bent’s type s∗1 < φ(s
∗), and a function τ : [s∗ s∗ + ] → [0 s∗1) such that the elements of
the set {
(si s1) : si ∈
[
s∗ s∗ + ] s1 ∈ (τ(si) s∗1]} (16)
satisfy v(si s1) < vˆ(s1) and the elements of the (possibly empty) set{
(si s1) : si ∈
[
s∗ s∗ + ] s1 ∈ [0 τ(si))}
satisfy v(si s1) ≥ vˆ(s1). Since φ is an increasing function, the second best allocates to
the entrant with highest type when the vector of the highest type of the entrants and the
incumbent’s type lies in any of these two sets. The difference between the two sets is that
the first best allocates to the incumbent in the former set and to the entrant with highest
type in the latter. That this construction exists is a consequence of the conditions of the
proposition.
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Since the solution to (2) is unique a.e. (see Lemma 2), we can pick s∗ such that φ(s∗)
is the unique solution to (2), which implies that for any s˜1 <φ(s∗),∫ φ(s∗)
s˜1
(
v
(
s∗ s1
)− vˆ(s1))dF1(s1) > 0 (17)
We prove the proposition by showing that an entrant with type s∗ has a strictly prof-
itable deviation: to behave as a type s∗ + (according to the original strategy) until either
(a) the incumbent quits, (b) all the other entrants quit, or (c) the price reaches vˆ(φ(s∗)).
When either (a) or (b) occurs first, our entrant uses the optimal strategies in Lemma 3(ii)
and (iii), respectively. When (c) occurs first, the deviating entrant quits immediately and
loses in the auction because she is outbid by the incumbent.
To show that the deviation is strictly profitable, we distinguish four cases. We prove
that the deviation gives the same payoffs as the original strategy in the first three cases,
but the deviation does strictly better than the original strategy in the last one. Thus, that
there are strict incentives to deviate follows from the fact that the last case has strictly
positive probability.
(i) If the highest of the other entrants’ types, say y(1), is less than s∗ and the incum-
bent’s type s1 is strictly less than φ(s∗), our entrant wins the auction with the
original strategy and the same holds true for a type s∗ + . This is a consequence
of Proposition 1 and the initial hypothesis that the original strategy profile im-
plements the second best. Besides, (c) cannot occur before (a) by Lemma 3(i)
since s1 < φ(s∗). Thus, either (a) or (b) occurs at a price at which the deviating
entrant is still active with the original strategy and with the deviation. Since the
original strategy and the deviation prescribe the same play in both (a) and (b), the
deviation gives the same payoff as the original strategy.
(ii) If y(1) < s∗ and φ(s∗) < s1, our entrant loses the auction with the original strategy
as a consequence of Proposition 1 and the initial hypothesis. She also loses af-
ter the deviation because φ(s∗) < s1 and Lemma 3(i) imply that (b) or (c) occurs
before (a), and that the deviating entrant is outbid by the incumbent in either (b)
or (c).
(iii) If y(1) > s∗ + , our entrant with type s∗ loses the auction with the original strategy
as a consequence of Proposition 1 and the initial hypothesis. The same holds
true for a type s∗ + . This implies that our entrant with type s∗ also loses with
our proposed deviation. This is direct if either (c) occurs first or the deviation
means quitting before (a), (b), and (c) occur. This is also true when either (a) or
(b) occurs because in either case, Lemma 3(ii) and (iii) mean that the proposed
deviation prescribes quitting at a price lower than that associated to a type s∗ + 
in the original strategy.
(iv) Suppose now that y(1) ∈ (s∗ s∗ + ). The initial hypothesis and Proposition 1
means that the deviating entrant does not win the auction and, hence, gets a zero
payoff when playing the original strategy. We show that the deviation gives the
Theoretical Economics 13 (2018) Inefficient rushes in auctions 295
deviating entrant strictly positive expected profits in this case. To prove so, we
distinguish three subcases:
(α) Suppose s1 < τ(y(1)). We shall argue that the deviating entrant makes non-
negative payoffs. This is direct if (c) occurs first. If (a) occurs first, our entrant
also loses because, first, the deviation prescribes quitting immediately after
the incumbent quits at price vˆ(s1) if v(s∗ s1) < vˆ(s1) and otherwise to quit at
v(s∗ s1); second, by definition of τ, s1 < τ(y(1)) means that v(y(1) s1) > vˆ(s1)
and v(· s1) increasing means that v(y(1) s1) > v(s∗ s1); third, v(y(1) s1) >
vˆ(s1) and Lemma 3(ii) implies that the entrant with type y(1) quits at price
v(y(1) s1). If (b) occurs first at a generic price p, that (c) has not occurred
yet means that p < vˆ(φ(s∗)), which together with Lemma 3 means that the
deviating entrant remains active until price vˆ(φ(s∗)), and wins and pays the
incumbent’s bid vˆ(s1) if vˆ(s1) < vˆ(φ(s∗)) to get
∫ φ(s∗)
vˆ−1(p)
(
v
(
s∗ s1
)− vˆ(s1))dF1(s1)
which is strictly positive by (17).
(β) Suppose s1 ∈ (τ(y(1))φ(s∗)). We shall argue that the deviating entrant’s ex-
pected payoff is at least
∫ φ(s∗)
τ(y(1))
(
v
(
s∗ s1
)− vˆ(s1))dF1(s1)
which is strictly positive by (17), by distinguishing two possibilities:
• Suppose s1 ∈ (τ(y(1)) s∗1]. This implies that v(y(1) s1) − vˆ(s1) < 0, and,
hence, that v(s∗ s1)− vˆ(s1) < 0 since s∗ < y(1). This means that if (a) oc-
curs first, the deviating bidder and all the remaining entrants quit imme-
diately after the incumbent, the latter as a consequence of Lemma 3(ii).
If the tie-breaking rule allocates the good to the deviating entrant, she
gets a payoff of v(s∗ s1)− vˆ(s1) as desired. Otherwise, she gets a zero pay-
off, which is not less than v(s∗ s1) − vˆ(s1) as desired. If (b) occurs first,
Lemma 3 and s1 < φ(s∗) imply that the deviating entrant wins the auc-
tion with the deviation and gets a payoff of v(s∗ s1)− vˆ(s1) as desired. Fi-
nally, (c) cannot occur first because the incumbent quits before the price
reaches vˆ(φ(s∗)) as a consequence of s1 <φ(s∗) and Lemma 3(i).
• Suppose s1 ∈ (s∗1φ(s∗)). The same reasons as above imply that (c) can-
not occur first. If (b) occurs first, the deviating entrant wins and pays
vˆ(s1) as desired because she bids vˆ(φ(s∗)), the incumbent bids vˆ(s1),
and s1 < φ(s∗). Finally, we argue that (a) cannot occur before (b) be-
cause of three reasons. First, s1 > s∗1 means that the incumbent is still
active at price vˆ(s∗1). Second, our proposed deviation does not move out
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of the equilibrium path before (a), (b), or (c) is reached. Third, any equi-
librium that implements the second best satisfies along the equilibrium
path that only one entrant remains active at price v(s∗1) if the entrants’
types are less than s∗ +  and the incumbent is still active. This latter
property follows from the fact that the second best is incompatible with
a tie and that Lemma 3(ii) means that the remaining entrants quit im-
mediately if the incumbent quits at price vˆ(s∗1) since v(x s
∗
1)− vˆ(s∗1) < 0
for any x < s∗ +  because (s∗ +  s∗1) belongs to the set in (16).
(γ) Suppose s1 > φ(s∗). We shall argue that the deviating entrant makes a zero
payoff. This is straightforward if (c) occurs first. If (b) occurs first, Lemma 3(i)
and s1 > φ(s∗) mean that the incumbent outbids the deviating bidder and,
hence, the latter gets a zero payoff. Finally, (a) cannot occur first because (c)
occurs before (a) since s1 >φ(s∗). 
Proof of Proposition 3
Since our proposed strategies are derived from Lemma 3, we only need to check for an
entrant’s unilateral deviation to a bid21 b ∈ [vˆ(0) vˆ(1)] in information sets in which no
bidder has quit yet, assuming that the deviating entrant plays optimally in the continu-
ation game. This deviation gives zero payoffs except in the following cases.
If the other entrant quits first, Lemma 3 and φ(si) = 1 mean that the deviating en-
trant wins at a price fixed by the incumbent’s bid, and thus gets22
∫ γ−1(vˆ−1(b))
0
∫ 1
γ(sj)
(
v(si s1)− vˆ(s1)
)
dF1(s1)dF(sj) (18)
If the incumbent quits first and the deviating entrant quits immediately after be-
cause v(si s1)− vˆ(s1) ≤ 0 (see Lemma 3(ii)), our entrant wins with probability 1/2 after
a tie if the other entrant also quits after the incumbent, which occurs when her type is
less than ρ(s1). Thus, our entrant gets23∫ vˆ−1(b)
0
∫ ρ(s1)
min{γ−1(s1)ρ(s1)}
1
2
(
v(si s1)− vˆ(s1)
)−
dF(sj)dF1(s1) (19)
If the incumbent quits first and the deviating entrant does not quit immediately af-
ter because v(si s1)− vˆ(s1) > 0, the deviating entrant wins and pays the other entrant’s
bid when the deviating entrant’s value v(si s1) is greater than the other entrant’s bid
max{vˆ(s1) v(sj s1)}. Our entrant gets
∫ vˆ−1(b)
0
∫ 1
γ−1(s1)
(
v(si s1)−max
{
vˆ(s1) v(sj s1)
})+
dF(sj)dF1(s1) (20)
21The restriction to [vˆ(0) vˆ(1)] is without loss of generality since b < vˆ(0) and b > vˆ(1) give, respectively,
the same expected payoff as vˆ(0) and vˆ(1).
22We adopt the convention that γ−1(s1)= s for s1 ∈ [γ(s)1].
23We denote (a)− ≡min{a0} and (a)+ ≡max{a0} for any a ∈R.
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The sum of (18)–(20) is (i) supermodular in (si b), (ii) has a derivative with respect
to b equal to zero for si ∈ [0 s] and b = vˆ(γ(si)), and (iii) its derivative with respect to
b is equal to zero for b ∈ [vˆ(γ(s)) vˆ(1)] and si = s. Statement (i) is straightforward; (ii)
follows from (5) and v(si γ(si))− vˆ(γ(si)) < 0 for si ∈ [0 s]; (iii) follows because each of
the equations (18)–(20) is constant in b for b ∈ [vˆ(γ(s)) vˆ(1)] and si = s—(18) because
γ−1(b)= s, (19) because v(s s1)− vˆ(s1)≥ 0 for any s1 ≥ γ(s) since v(sγ(s))− vˆ(γ(s))= 0
and we assume (IV), and (20) because γ−1(s1)= s for s1 ∈ [γ(s)1].
Statements (i) and (ii) imply that the sum of (18)–(20) evaluated at si ∈ [0 s] is non-
increasing in b for b ∈ [vˆ(γ(si)) vˆ(γ(s))]. Furthermore, (i) and (iii) imply that the sum
of (18)–(20) evaluated at si ∈ [0 s] is nonincreasing in b for b ∈ [vˆ(γ(s)) vˆ(1)]. Thus,
one can conclude that for any si ∈ [0 s], the sum of (18)–(20) is nonincreasing in b
for b ∈ (vˆ(γ(si) vˆ(1)]. By a symmetric argument, one can also conclude that for any
si ∈ [01], the sum of (18)–(20) is nondecreasing in b for b ∈ [vˆ(0) vˆ(γ(si))). This implies
that for any si ∈ [01], b= vˆ(γ(si)) maximizes the sum of (18)–(20) as desired.
Proof of Proposition 4
As in a private value second price auction, the incumbent finds it weakly dominant to
bid his value in both rounds, and hence has no incentive to deviate. A similar argument
as in Lemma 3 means here that an entrant who follows our proposed strategy in the first
round does not have incentives to deviate unilaterally in the second round when the
other top bidder is the incumbent.
Next, we show that an entrant with type si who follows our proposed strategy in the
first round does not have incentives to deviate unilaterally in the second round when
the other top bidder is another entrant. Since we propose that the final bid in this case is
equal to the initial bid, a deviation consists of raising the final bid. This is not profitable
if our entrant’s expected value conditional on the incumbent not being a top bidder is
less than our entrant’s initial bid, i.e.,
∫ vˆ−1(σ(si))
0
(
v(si s1)− σ(si)
)
dF1(s1)≤ 0 (21)
We show that this inequality is satisfied by the definition of σ . In the third case of Defi-
nition 4, (21) follows from (9) since σ(si) > vˆ(1) means that vˆ−1(σ(si))= 1. In the second
case of Definition 4, (21) follows because its left hand side is equal to the first integral of
(8), the second integral of (8) is positive by (2), and the left hand side of (8) is equal to
zero. This completes our argument because in the first case of Definition 4, (7) means
that the incumbent bids higher than our entrant and thus the incumbent must neces-
sarily be the other top bidder.
Finally, we show that an entrant with type si does not find it optimal to deviate uni-
laterally from his first round bid σ(si) to a bid b0, assuming that she bids optimally in the
second round. We compute the payoffs of this deviation by distinguishing three cases.
(i) Our entrant submits the highest initial bid of the entrants and the other top bid-
der is another entrant. In this case, our entrant wins and pays the initial bid of
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the other top bidder because the other bidder is an entrant who does not raise
her final bid. Thus, our entrant’s payoff is
∫ σ−1(b0)
0
∫ vˆ−1(σ(y(1)))
0
(
v(si s1)− σ(y(1))
)
dF1(s1)dG(1)(y(1)) (22)
where G(1)(y(1)) denotes the distribution of the highest type of the other entrants,
and where we adopt the convention that vˆ−1(x) = 1 for x > vˆ(1) and vˆ−1(x) = 0
for x < vˆ(0).
(ii) Our entrant submits the highest initial bid of the entrants and the other top bid-
der is the incumbent. In this case, our entrant wins if her final bid bI outbids the
incumbent’s and pays the incumbent’s final bid. Thus, our entrant’s payoff is
max
bI≥b0
∫ σ−1(b0)
0
∫ vˆ−1(bI)
vˆ−1(σ(y(1)))
(
v(si s1)− vˆ(s1)
)
dF1(s1)dG(1)(y(1)) (23)
where the maximizer of this expression as a function of b0 is denoted by b∗I (b0).
(iii) Our entrant is a top bidder because she outbids the incumbent and submits the
second highest initial bid of the entrants. In this case, the entrant wins if her final
bid bE outbids the initial bid of the other top bidder because the other bidder is
an entrant who does not raise her final bid. Thus, our entrant’s payoff is
max
bE≥b0
∫ σ−1(bE)
σ−1(b0)
F(2)
(
σ−1(b0)|y(1)
)
×
(∫ vˆ−1(b0)
0
(
v(si s1)− σ(y(1))
)
dF1(s1)
)
dG(1)(y(1))
(24)
where F(2)(x|y(1)) denotes the probability that the second highest type of the
other entrants is less than x conditional on the highest type of the other entrants
equal to y(1). The first order conditions of (24) imply that the maximizer of (24) as
a function of b0 is
b∗E(b0)≡max
{
b0
∫ vˆ−1(b0)
0
v(si s1)dF1(s1)
F1
(
vˆ−1(b0)
)
}
 (25)
To finish the proof we show that the sum of (22), (23), and (24) is maximized at b0 =
σ(si). To do so, we check the following necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality:
(i) the derivative of the sum of (22), (23), and (24) with respect to b0 at b0 = σ(si) is equal
to zero, and (ii) the derivative of the sum of (22), (23), and (24) with respect to si increases
in b0, i.e., the resulting function is supermodular in (si b0).
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To prove (i), note the following facts:
• The derivative of (22) with respect to b0 at b0 = σ(si) is(∫ vˆ−1(σ(si))
0
(
v(si s1)− σ(si)
)
dF1(s1)
)
·G′(1)(si) ·
(
σ−1
)′(
σ(si)
)
 (26)
• The derivative of (23) is, by the envelope theorem,(∫ φ(si)
vˆ−1(σ(si))
(
v(si s1)− vˆ(s1)
)
dF1(s1)
)
·G′(1)(si) ·
(
σ−1
)′(
σ(si)
)
 (27)
since b∗I (σ(si)) = vˆ(φ(si)) because both maximizations in (2) and (23) have the
same solution when σ(si)≤ vˆ(φ(s)).
• The derivative of (24) with respect to si at b0 = σ(si) is zero since (21) means that
b∗E(σ(si))= σ(si) by (25).
Thus, (i) follows from applying to the sum of (26) and (27) the definition of σ(si) in
Definition 4.
To prove (ii), we use that the derivative of the sum of (22), (23), and (24) with respect
to si is, by the envelope theorem,
∫ σ−1(b0)
0
∫ b∗I (b0)
0
∂v(si s1)
∂si
dF1(s1)dG(1)(y(1))
+
∫ σ−1(b∗E(b0))
σ−1(b0)
F(2)
(
σ−1(b0)|y(1)
)(∫ vˆ−1(b0)
0
∂v(si s1)
∂si
dF1(s1)
)
dG(1)(y(1))
To prove that this expression is increasing in b0, note that vˆ, v, and σ are increasing
functions. Thus, it is sufficient to show that b∗I and b
∗
E are also increasing. The former is
direct from its definition in (23) and the latter from (25).
Proof of Proposition 5
Our equilibrium has the following features: (a) entrants initial bids are determined by
the same strictly increasing function σ ; (b) an entrant’s final bid is equal to her initial
bid if the other top bidder is an entrant; (c) an entrant’s final bid is equal to vˆ(φ(si))
if the other top bidder is the incumbent; (d) φ(si) < 1 implies that σ(si) ≤ vˆ(φ(si));24
(e) the incumbent uses the same strictly increasing function vˆ in both rounds. Feature
(a) implies that the entrant with the largest type s(1) is always a top bidder. This en-
trant wins the auction if φ(s(1)) is greater than the incumbent’s type as a consequence
of (b), (c), and (e). Features (a), (d), and (e) imply that if φ(s(1)) is less than the incum-
bent’s type, then the incumbent is the other top bidder. Besides, if φ(s(1)) is less than
24Note by Definition 2 that φ(s1) < 1 implies that
∫ 1
φ(si)
(v(si s1)− vˆ(s1))dF1(s1) ≤ 0, which implies that∫ 1
φ(si)
(v(si s1)− vˆ(1))dF1(s1) < 0, since vˆ is increasing. Thus
∫ 1
0 (v(si s1)− vˆ(1))dF1(s1) < 0 since v(si s1) is
increasing in s1. Consequently, φ(si) < 1 means that σ is defined by the first two cases in Definition 4 in
which σ(si)≤ vˆ(φ(si)).
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the incumbent’s type, (c) and (e) imply that the incumbent wins. Thus, our equilibrium
implements the allocation associated to φ and, thus, it is second best by Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 6
Since incumbents play their weakly dominant strategy, they do not have incentives to
deviate. Next, we study the incentives of an entrant to deviate unilaterally from the pro-
posed strategies. An adaptation of the argument that bidding one’s value, if known, is
optimal means that the entrant does not have an incentive to deviate in Case E. Defini-
tion 5 means that the bid in Case D is optimal. Next, we show that there are no incentives
to deviate in Case C with a similar argument as in Proposition 4.
We start by computing the payoffs of an entrant with type s after a unilateral devia-
tion to bid bˆ assuming that she bids optimally in the last round. We denote by sj the type
of the incumbent still active and by sk the type of the other entrant active. To simplify
the notation we drop the dependence on the vector of types of the other incumbents
inferred from their bids. We let sj and sk be the highest type of the incumbents and of
the entrants, respectively, who have already quit. We distinguish three cases.
(a) Case bˆ > σj(sk) > vˆ(sj). This is, our entrant bids higher than the other entrant
and the other entrant bids higher than the incumbent. In this case, both entrants
compete in the last round and the minimum bid is set by the incumbent’s bid
vˆ(sj). This gives expected payoffs25
∫ vˆ−1(bˆ)
sj
max
b≥vˆ(sj)
∫ σ−1j (bˆ)
σ−1j (vˆ(sj))
1b≥max{v(sksj)vˆ(sj)}
× (v(s sj)−max{v(sk sj) vˆ(sj)})dFk(sk)dFj(sj)
(28)
since our deviating entrant wins in case of a tie and the other entrant bids
max{v(sk sj) vˆ(sj)} in the last round.
(b) Case σj(sk) > bˆ > vˆ(sj). This is, our entrant bids less than the other entrant but
more than the incumbent. As above, both entrants compete in the last round and
the minimum bid is set by the incumbent’s bid vˆ(sj). This gives expected payoffs
similar to those above,
∫ vˆ−1(bˆ)
sj
max
b≥vˆ(sj)
∫ 1
σ−1j (bˆ)
1b>max{v(sksj)vˆ(sj)}
× (v(s sj)−max{v(sk sj) vˆ(sj)})dFk(sk)dFj(sj);
(29)
the only difference is that in case of a tie, it is the other entrant who wins.
(c) Case bˆ > σj(sk) and vˆ(sj) > σj(sk). This is, the other entrant submits the lowest
bid. In this case, the deviating entrant and the incumbent compete in the last
25The term 1X is an indicator function that takes value 1 if X is satisfied and 0 otherwise.
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round and the minimum bid is set by the other entrant’s bid σj(sk). This gives
expected payoffs
∫ σ−1j (bˆ)
sk
max
b≥σj(sk)
∫ vˆ−1(b)
vˆ−1(σj(sk))
(
v(s sj)− vˆ(sj)
)
dFj(sj)dFk(sk) (30)
since the incumbent bids in the last round vˆ(sj), and thus ties do not occur with
positive probability and the deviating entrant wins if and only if b≥ vˆ(sj), i.e., sj ≤
vˆ−1(b).
Next, we show that the sum of (28), (29), and (30) is maximized at bˆ = σj(s) for any
s ≥ sk. To do so, we check the following necessary and sufficient conditions of optimal-
ity: (i) the derivative of the sum of (28), (29), and (30) with respect to bˆ evaluated at
bˆ= σj(s) is equal to zero; (ii) the derivative of the sum of (28), (29), and (30) with respect
to s increases in bˆ, i.e., the sum of the sum of (28), (29), and (30) is supermodular in (s bˆ).
To prove (i), we use the envelope theorem to show the following results:
• The derivative of (28) with respect to bˆ at bˆ= σj(s) is equal to F
′
k(s)
σ ′j(s)
times
∫ vˆ−1(σj(s))
sj
1b∗(sj)≥max{v(ssj)vˆ(sj)}
(
v(s sj)−max
{
v(s sj) vˆ(sj)
})
dFj(sj) (31)
where b∗(sj) = max{v(s sj) vˆ(sj)} is the optimizer of the maximization in (28).
Thus, (31) is equal to
∫ vˆ−1(σj(s))
sj
(
v(s sj)− vˆ(sj)
)−
dFj(sj) (32)
• The derivative of (29) with respect to bˆ at bˆ= σj(s) is equal to F
′
j(vˆ
−1(σj(s)))
vˆ′(vˆ−1(σj(s)))
times
∫ 1
sj
1b∗(sj)>max{v(sksj)σj(s)}
(
v(s sj)−max
{
v(sk sj)σj(s)
})
dFk(sk) (33)
(for sj = vˆ−1(σj(s))) plus F
′
k(s)
σ ′j(s)
times
−
∫ vˆ−1(σj(s))
sj
1b∗(sj)>max{v(ssj)vˆ(sj)}
(
v(s sj)−max
{
v(s sj) vˆ(sj)
})
dFj(sj) (34)
where b∗(sj) = max{v(s sj) vˆ(sj)} is the optimizer of the maximization in (29).
Thus, (33) and (34) are equal to zero.
• The derivative of (30) with respect to bˆ at bˆ= σj(s) is equal to F
′
k(s)
σ ′j(s)
times
∫ vˆ−1(b∗∗)
vˆ−1(σj(s))
(
v(s sj)− vˆ(sj)
)
dFj(sj) (35)
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where b∗∗ = vˆ(φj(s)) is the optimizer of the maximization in (30). Thus, (35) is
equal to ∫ φj(s)
vˆ−1(σj(s))
(
v(s sj)− vˆ(sj)
)
dFj(sj) (36)
Hence, (i) follows from applying the definition of σj in (11) to the sum of (32) and (36).
Recall that, for notational convenience, we left aside the dependence on s−j .
To prove (ii), note that the derivative of (30) with respect to s is increasing in bˆ by the
envelope theorem. Next, note that the envelope theorem also implies that the derivative
of the sum of (28) and (29) with respect to s is equal to the sum of the increasing function
of bˆ,
∫ vˆ−1(bˆ)
sj
∫ 1
σ−1j (vˆ(sj))
1b∗(sj)>max{v(sksj)vˆ(sj)}
∂v(s sj)
∂s
dFk(sk)dFj(sj)
+
∫ vˆ−1(bˆ)
sj
∫ vˆ−1(bˆ)
σ−1j (vˆ(sj))
1b∗(sj)=max{v(sksj)vˆ(sj)}
∂v(s sj)
∂s
dFk(sk)dFj(sj)
where b∗(sj)=max{v(s sj) vˆ(sj)} is the optimizer of the maximizations in (28) and (29).
Consequently, we can conclude that there are no incentives to deviate in Case C.
To show that there are no strict incentives to deviate in Case A or in Case B, it is suf-
ficient to show that the continuation payoffs are (α) nonnegative and (β) equal to zero if
the deviating entrant’s type is less than the second highest type of the other entrants sk.
This is because a downward deviation in either Case A or Case B only means that the
deviating entrant may miss the opportunity to bid in Case C or in Case E, and an upward
deviation in Case A (in Case B it is not payoff relevant) only means that the entrant can
bid in Case C or Case E in some additional cases in which the second highest type of the
other entrants is larger than the type of the deviating entrant.
Property (α) is satisfied when we move from Case A to Case E because the deviating
bidder can guarantee zero payoffs by bidding the minimum bid in the round. This bid
loses with probability 1 because the minimum bid is fixed by the minimum bid in the
round in Case A and the other entrants who are still active weakly increase their bids
from the round in Case A to the round in Case E. Property (β) is satisfied when we move
from Case A to Case E because the deviating entrant cannot find it profitable to outbid
in Case E an entrant with a larger type that follows our proposed bids.
That (α) is satisfied when we move from Case A or B to Case C (or from Case A to
Case B and then to Case C) is similar. The deviating bidder can guarantee zero payoffs
by bidding the minimum bid in the round, in this case, because the incumbent who is
still active bids with probability 1 above the minimum bid. To show that (β) is satisfied
when we move from Case A or B to Case C (or from Case A to Case B and then to Case C),
we use that the continuation payoffs of a deviating entrant with type s are equal to the
sum of (29), (30), and (28) evaluated at the value of bˆ that maximizes this sum. Hence,
(β) can be deduced from the following two features. First, the continuation payoffs of an
entrant with type s is zero if s = sk. To see why, note that we have already argued that the
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value of bˆ that maximizes the sum of (29), (30), and (28) for s = sk is bˆ = σj(sk). In this
case, (29) and (30) are equal to zero, and (28) does not apply because bˆ > σj(sk) does
not hold for any sk > sk and bˆ = σj(sk). Second, the continuation payoffs are weakly
increasing in s. This can be shown by applying the envelope theorem to the sum of (29),
(30), and (28) evaluated at the optimal bˆ.
Proof of Proposition 7
We first note that the unique weakly dominant strategy of the incumbents in the open
ascending auction is to bid their values, and that all incumbents have the same strictly
increasing value function. This implies that any equilibrium in weakly undominated
strategies of the open ascending auction satisfies two properties: an incumbent is as-
signed the good only if he has the largest type of the incumbents, and an incumbent
who gets the good assigned for a certain type also gets the good assigned for larger types
if the other bidders’ types remain constant.
Next, note that our survival auction implements the allocation associated to {φj}j∈I ;
see Lemma 5 in the Supplementary Appendix. This is the good assigned to either the
incumbent with he highest type sj or the entrant with the highest type s depending on
whether sj is greater or less than φj(s s−j), respectively, for s−j , the vector of the other
incumbents’ types.
Consequently, to prove the proposition, we show (i) that the allocation associated to
{φj}j∈I maximizes the expected social surplus among the allocations that satisfy the two
properties above, and (ii) that the optimal allocations in this restricted set never assign
with positive probability to entrants who do not have the largest type. Part (ii) is direct:
for any allocation in the restricted set that allocates to an entrant whose type is not the
highest, the allocation that instead allocates to the entrant with the highest type gives
strictly higher expected social surplus and belongs to the restricted set. To prove (i), we
use an adaptation of the argument in the paragraph before Proposition 1.
Any allocation that satisfies the above two properties and that only allocates to an
entrant if she has the largest type can be characterized with cutoffs for the highest type of
the incumbent as a function of the other bidders’ types such that the good is allocated to
the incumbent only if it is above the cutoff and otherwise to the entrant with the highest
type. There is no loss in assuming that the cutoffs do not depend on the entrants’ types
but the highest types. This is so as the other entrants types do not affect the comparison
between allocating to the incumbent with the highest type or to the entrant with the
highest type. We denote the cutoffs with a set of functions {φˆj}i∈I , where φˆj(s; s−j) is the
cutoff for incumbent j when s−j is the vector of other incumbents’ types and s is the the
highest of the entrants’types. The expected social surplus of the allocation with cutoffs
given by {φˆj}i∈I is equal to
∑
j∈I
∫
[01]nI−1
∫ 1
0
(∫ φˆj(s;s−j)
sj(s−j)
v(s; s−j sj)dFj(sj)
+
∫ 1
φˆj(s;s−j)
vˆ(sj)dFj(sj)
)
dF(1)(s)dF−j(s−j)
(37)
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where sj(s−j) is equal to the largest element of s−j , F(1)(s) is the distribution of the largest
type of the entrants, and F−j(s−j) is the distribution of the vector of the incumbents’
types s−j where incumbent j has been excluded.
Since (37) is equal to
∑
j∈I
∫
[01]nI−1
∫ 1
0
∫ φˆj(s;s−j)
sj(s−j)
(
v(s; s−j sj)− vˆ(sj)
)
dFj(sj)dF(1)(s)dF−j(s−j)
+
∑
j∈I
∫
[01]nI−1
∫ 1
0
∫ 1
sj(s−j)
vˆ(sj)dFj(sj)dF(1)(s)dF−j(s−j)
Definition 5 means that {φˆj(s; s−j))}j = {φj(s; s−j))}j maximizes (37), which implies the
proposition.
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